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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT 1. Supplying of Soviet Equipment to Chinese Communists

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25X1C 2. Coercion of Chinese Communist Troops, Korea

PLACE 3. Movement of Chinese Wounded and Troops South

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

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1. In early May Soviet Lieutenant General T'o-ni-fu (托尼夫)¹ notified the Chinese Communist Central Government authorities that, beginning 15 May, all weapons and equipment for the Chinese Communists from the USSR were to be supplied directly from Soviet arsenals in Siberia. He also requested that the Chinese Communists attempt to make appropriate change in the supply setup to effect better coordination and thus insure more efficient and rapid distribution to Chinese Communist troops.

2. In each company of Chinese Communist troops in Korea is a "political workers supervisory unit" composed of one political worker and five soldiers with the mission of directing the fighting. All orders issued by this unit must be obeyed by all members of the company including the company commander. Chinese Communist troops were being forced to advance day and night even under heavy United Nations artillery barrages and air bombings. They were warned by political workers of the supervisory unit that if they fall

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behind they will be killed immediately.

3. In early May the Chinese Communist 39, 40 and 42 Armies were being transferred from Korea to Central China for reorganization because of heavy casualties in the war. On 22 May, 30,000 troops arrived in Hankow.²

4. Between 20 April and 20 May, 26,000 Chinese Communist officers and men with minor wounds received in Korea arrived in Hankow from Manchuria. They were being sent by the health office of the Central and South Military Area Command to military and large privately owned hospitals in Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Kwangtung for medical treatment.

5. On 24 May, 700 Chinese Communist troops wounded in Korea arrived at North Railroad Station, Shanghai, and were immediately sent to an army hospital in the Shanghai suburbs. Approximately 1,000 representatives of Chinese Communist organizations in Shanghai assembled near the railroad station to welcome these troops but were prevented by Chinese Communist authorities from approaching them. LU I (陸一), secretary of the Shanghai Resist America and Aid Korea Committee, addressed representatives and thanked them on behalf of the soldiers for having come to meet them.

6. In late May the Chinese Communists were planning to bring about two armies of the 4 Field Army during the rainy season for garrison duty in Kwangtung and other units to Fukien, apparently for another attempt to reduce Chin-men Island.

7. In late May all available flat and freight cars in Canton were being sent north to Wuchang to bring back divisions of the 4 Field Army from Korea to Kwangtung and Fukien, and also to bring wounded to hospitals south of the Yangtze River. Many cars were scheduled to leave for the north by 2 June.

8. In late May replacements for the wounded and troops transferred south were being taken from raw recruits from Kwangtung and other provinces.

1. Comment. T'ao-ni-fu may be Ivan Konev, commander of Soviet ground forces.

2. Comment. If these troops have no connection with the information in the previous sentence, presumably they are destined for Korea.

3. Comment. Possibly also to prevent the delegation from seeing the troops.